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Abstract
In public-key encryption, a long-term private key can be an easy target for hacking
and deserves extra protection. One way to enhance its security is to share the long-term
private key among multiple (say n) distributed servers; any threshold number (t, t ≤ n) of
these servers are needed to collectively use the shared private key without reconstructing
it. As a result, an attacker who has compromised less than t servers will still not be able
to reconstruct the shared private key.
In this thesis, we studied threshold decryption schemes for lattice-based public-key en-
cryption, which is one of the most promising post-quantum public-key encryption schemes.
We developed threshold decryption schemes for Stinson’s, the standard NTRU, and NTRU
with Ring Learning with Errors (R-LWE) cryptosystems. Prototype implementations were
developed for validating the functionality of these threshold decryption schemes. Our de-





In the setting of public-key cryptosystem, a user, Bob, first generates a public/private
key pair and then distributes his public key to other people. Bob’s private key must be kept
confidential and if necessary, online for decrypting incoming ciphertext or digitally signing
messages on the fly. Such an online, long-term secret is an attractive target for hacking and
given enough time and efforts, its compromise seems inevitable.
One way to mitigate the threat against the online, long-term private key is to share
it among multiple (say n, n is an integer) distributed servers in such a way that any
threshold number (say t, t ≤ n) can work together to collectively use the shared private key
without actually reconstructing it in the process. The collective computation by the willing
participating servers can be either decryption or digital signing. This cryptographic scheme
is called threshold decryption or threshold digital signing correspondingly. Together they
are called threshold cryptography [8, 7, 9, 12, 14, 13, 32].
It is worth noting that threshold cryptography is different from threshold secret sharing
[30, 3] in important ways. In both, a long-term secret is shared among n parties in a way
that any t or more of them are capable of working together to reconstruct the shared secret.
In threshold secret sharing, the shared secret is indeed reconstructed in its use and the
reconstruction point will be a single point of attack. In threshold cryptography, however,
the shared secret is never reconstructed and thus there is no single point of attack. In some
sense, threshold cryptography is security extension of threshold secret sharing.
Problem Statement
Most existing popular public-key encryption schemes, including RSA [29], ElGamal [11],
Elliptic-curve [21, 24], are vulnerable to attacks from general quantum computers running
appropriate quantum algorithms [31, 25].
One of the most promising public-key cryptosystems that will be secure in post-quantum
era is based on lattices [18, 26, 23, 28, 34]. Example lattice-based cryptosystems include
NTRUEncrypt [18], Stinson’s NTRU scheme [34], learning with error (LWE) [27], and
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NTRU with R-LWE [33].
How can we add threshold mechanisms to these lattice-based cryptosystems?
Overview
The remaining of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we shall review the
basic concepts and building blocks of lattice-based cryptosystems. Our review will come
with small concrete examples. In Chapter 3, we shall present our threshold lattice cryp-
tosystems, including threshold Stinson’s NTRU, threshold NTRUEncrypt, and threshold
NTRU with R-LWE. Concrete examples will be used in the description of these threshold
schemes.
Security analysis of these schemes and related work will be provided in 4. Concluding




A ring is a set with two operations, addition and multiplication, that has special prop-
erties. The set of integers (Z) is a ring, as is Z[x], the set of polynomials with integer
coefficients.
Definition 2.1 (Ring). The set R is a ring if it has binary operations for addition and
multiplication defined that meet the following axioms.
• Addition is associative.
(a+ b) + c = a+ (b+ c)
• Addition is commutative.
a+ b = b+ a
• An additive identity exists.
a+ 0 = a
• An additive inverse exists.
a+ (−a) = 0
• Multiplication is associative.
(ab)c = a(bc)
• A multiplicative identity exists.
1a = a
• Multiplication is distributive with respect to addition.
a(b+ c) = ab+ ac
(a+ b)c = ac+ bc
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Definition 2.2 (Ideal Ring). Let R be a ring. I is an ideal ring if for any x, y ∈ I and
r ∈ R
x+ y ∈ I
rx ∈ I
Definition 2.3 (Quotient Ring). Let R be a ring and I be an ideal of that ring. The
quotient ring is R/I.
If Z[x] is a ring, n is an integer and xn − 1 is an ideal of that ring, the quotient ring
is Z[x]/(xn − 1). Another way to view it is the polynomials in the quotient ring are the
polynomials in R mod I.
Gaussian Distributions
A Gaussian distribution is also known as a normal distribution or bell curve. A value
sampled from a Gaussian distribution is expected to be within one standard deviation from
the mean 68% of the time. It will be within two standard deviations 95% of the time and
99.7% of the time will be within three standard deviations.
Lattices
A vector is an ordered tuple of values where the values are real numbers (R). Let n be
an integer, Rn is a vector of n real numbers. A vector written horizontally is called a row
vector, written vertically it is a column vector. Two vectors can be added and multiplied.
Addition is performed by adding the matching indices
a =
[








a1 + b1 a2 + b2 . . . an + bn
]
Scalar or dot product multiplication is performed by multiplying the matching indices
and summing the results.
a · b = a1b1 + a2b2 + . . .+ anbn
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Definition 2.4 (Linearly Independent). A set of vectors (v1, v2, . . . vn) is considered linearly
independent if for all scalar values a1, a2, . . . an the equation
a1v1 + a2v2 + . . .+ anvn = 0
only if a1, a2, . . . , an = 0.
Definition 2.5 (Basis). A basis of Rn is a set of linearly independent vectors where any
vector in Rn can be expressed as a linear combination of the basis vectors.

















Definition 2.6 (Determinant). The determinant of a matrix is a scalar measurement of a
square matrix. The determinate of a matrix (M) is denoted by det(M), |M | or ||M ||. The
determinate is calculated as the sum of the products of the permutation of row and column







|A| = aei+ bgf + cdh− ceg − bdi− afh
A matrix with a determinate of ±1 is called a unimodular matrix. Unimodular opera-
tions on a basis matrix produce another basis matrix. The unimodular operations are
• Multiply any row by −1.
• Interchange any two rows.
• Add an integral multiple of any row to another row.
Definition 2.7 (Lattice). A lattice is the set of all liner combinations of basis vectors with
integral coefficients.
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What makes lattices of interest in cryptography are two problems, the Shortest Vector
(SVP) and Closest Vector (CVP) problems.
Definition 2.8 (Shortest Vector Problem). Given a basis for a lattice L in Rn. Find a
vector v ∈ L where v is not all 0 such that ||v|| is minimized. The vector v is the shortest
vector in L
Definition 2.9 (Closest Vector Problem). Given a basis for a lattice L in Rn and a vector
w ∈ Rn that is not in L. Find a vector v ∈ L such that ||w − v|| is minimized. The vector
v is the closest vector to w in L.
The CVP is known to be NP-hard, and SVP is NP-hard under certain conditions when
the vectors are randomized and independent with uniform distributions chosen over all
vectors in Zn [2].
LLL
The Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovàsz (LLL) algorithm 2.1 is a lattice basis reduction algorithm
[22] that can be used to solve the SVP. The LLL algorithm performs a series of reduce and
exchange steps until it meets the definition of an LLL-reduced lattice. The definition allows
for getting the exact shortest vector or an approximation of it. Getting an approximation
is guaranteed to complete in polynomial time, however, getting the exact vector is not
guaranteed to complete.
In the reduction step it makes use of the Gram-Schmidt process in reducing the matrix.
Definition 2.10 (Gram Matrix). The Gram matrix ∆(L) of a lattice L is the matrix where
the (i, j) entry is the scalar product of the i-th and j-th basis vectors.
Definition 2.11 (Gram-Schmidt Process). The Gram-Schmidt process takes a basis and
generates an orthogonal basis.
• Let v1, v2, . . . , vn form a basis.
• Let the orthogonal basis be v∗1, v∗2, . . . , v∗n.
• Calculate v∗i by
v∗1 = v1
7










The Gram-Schmidt coefficient is µij .
Definition 2.12 (LLL Reduced). A basis for a lattice is LLL-reduced with parameter α if
• 14 < α ≤ 1
• |µij | ≤ 12 for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ n
• |v∗I + µi,i−1v∗i−1 ≥ α|v∗v−1|2 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n
The standard value for α is 34 . The value of α determines how reduced the basis is, the
higher the value the more reduced a basis produced. For values of α < 1, the algorithm is
guaranteed to complete in polynomial time. A value of 1 will produce the shortest vector
but is not guaranteed to complete.
Learning With Errors
Given a system of linear equations of n variables, it is possible to find solutions efficiently.
Injecting a bit of randomness to the equations makes it more difficult to solve. Based on
this, Regev introduced Learning With Errors (LWE) [27].
Definition 2.13 (Learning With Errors). Let n ≥ 1 and p be prime. The secret s ∈ Znp .
Choose ai independently and uniformly over Znp . With the probability distribution X : Zp →
R+ on Zp. Chose ei ∈ Zp independently according to X .
bi = 〈s · ai〉+ ei
Given ai and bi, determine s.
The value of p, n and X must be chosen correctly. If not, security may be compromised,
or decryption may not be possible. The value of p must be significantly greater than n and
X should be a Gaussian distribution. Regev proved that for certain choices of p and X
the average-case solution is based on the worst-case lattice problem, Gap Shortest Vector,
which is similar to the SVP. This implies a quantum solution to the problem.
8
Algorithm 2.1 LLL
1: procedure Reduce(k, l)
2: if |µkl| > 12 then
3: yk ← yk − dµklcyl
4: for j ← (1, 2, . . . , l − 1) do
5: µkj ← µkj − dµklcµlj
6: µkl ← µkl − dµklc
7: procedure Exchange(k)
8: yk, yk−1 ← yk−1, yk
9: v ← µk,k−1; δ ← γk + v2γk−1
10: µk,k−1 ← vγk−1/δ
11: γk ← γkγk−1/δ; γk−1 ← δ
12: for j ← (1, 2, . . . , k − 2) do
13: µkj , µk−1,j ← µk−1,j , µkj
14: for i← (k + 1, . . . , n) do
15: ξ ← µik; µik ← µi,k−1 − vµik
16: µi,k−1 ← µk,k−1µik + ξ
Input: a basis y1, y2, . . . , yn of the lattice L ⊂ Rn and α ∈ R where 14 < α < 1
17: for i← (1, 2, . . . , n) do
18: y∗i ← yi
19: for j ← (1, 2, . . . , i− 1) do
20: µij ← (yi · y∗i )/γj
21: γi ← y∗i · y∗i
22: k ← 2
23: while k ≤ n do
24: Reduce(k, k − 1)
25: if γk ≥ (α− µ2k,k−1)γk−1 then
26: for l← (k − 2, . . . , 1) do
27: Reduce(k, l)
28: k ← k + 1
29: else
30: Exchange(k)
31: if k > 2 then
32: k ← k − 1
9
Example 2.1 (LLL).








































































143 > 83 [2.1.25]
Reduce
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Ring Learning With Errors
Ring Learning With Errors (R-LWE) [23] is similar to LWE, but uses polynomial rings.
Definition 2.14 (Ring Learning With Errors). Let n be the degree of the polynomials,
q = 1 mod 2n where the coefficients of the polynomial are mod q. Let Φ(x) be an irreducible
polynomial. All polynomials used are from the finite quotient ring Zq(x)/Φ(x). The secret s
is a small unknown polynomial. Let ai(x) be a set of random known polynomials and ei(x)
be a set of small random unknown polynomials.
bi(x) = 〈ai(x) · s(x)〉+ ei(x)
Given ai and bi determine s.
For the correct values of Φ(x), n and q Regev proved the average-case solution is also
based on the Gap Shortest Vector problem.
Standard NTRU
NTRU was first introduced at the rump session of Crypto’96 [15] by Hoffstein, Pipher
and Silverman. It uses polynomial rings for construction and lattices for the security proof.
It was presented as being quantum safe. At EUROCRYPT’97, the original version was
proven to not be as secure as claimed [6]. At ANTS’98 an updated version was presented
that addressed problems in the original. Another update was published in 2009 [18] and is
part of the IEEE P1363 Standard [1]. Although the standard has gone inactive, there has
been academic work on standard NTRU in recent years. Two NTRU variants of interest are
one that was introduced at Eurocrypt 2011 [33] which added R-LWE, and one introduced
by Stinson and Paterson in Cryptography: Theory and Practice [34].
All three use a technique called center mod or mods.
Definition 2.15 (Center Mod or Mods). Take the normal modulus and map it to the
interval [−q/2, q/2]. If the result of the modulus is greater than q/2 subtract q from modulus
result to get the centered mod.
Definition 2.16 (Standard NTRU). Standard NTRU has three public parameters, N a
positive integer, is the degree of polynomials, q is a large modulus and p a small modulus.
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The values of q and p should be co-prime and q >> p. The standard sets p = 3. The
polynomial ring is defined as R = Z[X]/(XN − 1).
• NTRU.KeyGen: let f and g be two small random polynomials with coefficients drawn
from {−1, 0, 1}.
Let fq be f inverted in Rq and fp be f inverted in Rp.
If f is not invertible or g is not invertible in Rq, choose new polynomials.
The private key is the pair (f, fp).
The public key is h = p ∗ g ∗ fq (mods q)
• NTRU.Encrypt: Let r be a small random polynomial. Let m be the messages. The
ciphertext y is calculated as
y = r ∗ h+m (mod q).
• NTRU.Decrypt:
a = f ∗ y (mods q)
m = fp ∗ a (mods p)
A 2017 paper [19], describes choosing the parameters for security and to avoid decryption
failures. For certain combinations of parameters, decryption failure is possible and weakens
the security of NTRU [20] with those parameters. Using the parameter sets from the
previously mentioned paper can reduce the chance of failure and maintain a given security
level.
Bits of Security N q
128 439 2048
256 (optimized for key size) 1087 2048
256 (optimized for encryption/decryption) 1499 2048
256 1171 2048
Example 2.2 (Standard NTRU).
Parameters
N = 11, p = 3 and q = 32
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Calculate the keys
f = −x10 + x9 + x6 − x4 + x2 + x− 1
g = −x10 − x8 + x5 + x3 + x2 − 1
fp = 2x
9 + x8 + 2x7 + x5 + 2x4 + 2x3 + 2x+ 1
fq = 30x
10 + 18x9 + 20x8 + 22x7 + 16x6 + 15x5 + 4x4 + 16x3 + 9x+ 5
h = 16x10 − 13x9 + 12x8 − 13x7 + 15x6 − 8x5 + 12x4 − 12x3 − 10x2 − 7x+ 8
Encryption
m = x10 + x9 − x8 − x4 + x3 − 1
r = −x7 − x5 + x4 + x3 + x2 − 1
y = 19x10 + 6x9 + 25x8 + 7x7 + 30x6 + 16x5 + 14x4 + 24x3 + 26x2 + 11x+ 14
Decryption
a = 7x10 − 3x9 + 5x8 + 7x7 + 6x6 + 7x5 + 10x4 − 11x3 − 10x2 − 7x+ 3
m = x10 + x9 − x8 − x4 + x3 − 1
Definition 2.17 (Stinson’s NTRU). Stinson’s version uses the same definition for the
public parameters, with the same recommendations.
• SNTRU.KeyGen: Let F and G be polynomials of degree N with coefficients from
{−1, 0, 1}
f = pF + 1
g = pG
Let f−1 be f inverted in Rq
The private key is f .
The public key is h = f−1g (mods q)
The values of F , G, and g are not needed after key generation, but should be kept
secret.
• SNTRU.Encrypt: Let r be a small random polynomial. Let m be the messages. The
ciphertext y is calculated as
y = r ∗ h+m (mods q)
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• SNTRU.Decrypt:
a = f ∗ y (mods q)
m = a (mods p)
Having f = pF + 1 allows the decryption process to be more efficient.
Example 2.3 (Stinson’s NTRU).
Parameters
N = 23, p = 3 and q = 31
Calculate the keys
F = x18 − x9 + x8 − x4 − x2
f = 3x18 − 3x9 + 3x8 − 3x4 − 3x2 + 1
G = x17 + x12 + x9 + x3 − x
g = 3x17 + 3x12 + 3x9 + 3x3 − 3x
h = −13x22 − 15x21 + 12x19 − 14x18 + 8x16 − 14x15 − 6x14 + 14x13 − 3x12 + 7x11 − 5x10
− 14x9 + 3x8 + 10x7 + 5x6 − 8x5 + 4x2 + x+ 8
Encryption
m = x15 − x12 + x7 − 1
r = x19 + x10 + x6 − x2
y = 5x22 − 15x21 + 4x20 + 8x19 + 10x18 − 15x17 + 6x16 + 8x15 − 8x14 + 3x13 − 10x12
− 7x11 − x10 − 9x9 + 12x8 − 14x7 + 15x6 − 10x5 + 15x4 − 14x3 − 5x2 − 15x− 3
Decryption
a = 6x22 + 3x21 − 6x20 − 3x19 − 3x17 + 7x15 + 6x13 − x12 − 9x11 + 3x10 + 3x9
− 5x7 + 6x4 + 3x3 + 6x2 − 3x+ 5
m = x15 − x12 + x7 − 1
NTRU with R-LWE is a provably secure version. Changes are made to the algorithm
that make it compatible with R-LWE, which leads to its proof of security.
Definition 2.18 (NTRU With R-LWE). Parameters for NTRU with R-LWE or provably
secure NTRU (pNE) have some overlap with the other two but adds additional public pa-
rameters.
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• Public Parameters [5]:
N - a power of 2 greater than 8.
q - a large prime. To guarantee decryption q ∈ [dn6ln(n), 2dn6ln(n)] where
d > 512 and q = 1 mod 2n.
p - 2








R = Z[X]/(XN + 1) - The change to XN + 1 is from R-LWE, and being an
irreducible polynomial is part of what makes it provably secure.
• pNE.KeyGen: Let F and g be polynomials of degree N with coefficients sampled from
a discrete Gaussian distribution with standard deviation σ.
f = pF + 1
Let f−1 be f inverted in Rq, if not resample F.
Let g be a polynomial invertible in Rq
The private key is f .
The public key is h = pf−1g (mods q)
The values of F , and g are not needed after key generation but should be kept secret.
• pNE.Encrypt: Let r and e be a small random polynomial whose coefficients are sam-
pled form a discrete Gaussian distribution with standard deviation α. Let m be the
messages. The ciphertext y is calculated as
y = r ∗ h+ p ∗ e+m (mods q)
Including p+e in the encryption is also from R-LWE and contributes to the provability
of the security.
• pNE.Decrypt:
a = f ∗ y (mods q)









F = x15 − x13 − x12 − x9 − x8 − x7 − x5 − x4 − x2
f = 2x15 − 2x13 − 2x12 − 2x9 − 2x8 − 2x7 − 2x5 − 2x4 − 2x2 + 1
g = x15 + 2x14 − x13 − x11 − x10 + x9 − 2x7 + x6 + x5 − x2 + x
h = −12x15 + 3x14 + 2x12 − 15x11 − 14x10 + 8x9 + 17x8 + 15x7 + 3x6 + 7x5 + 17x4
+ 13x3 − 18x2 − 10x+ 8
Encryption
m = x15 + x12 + x7 + 1
r = −x15 − x13 + x12 + x11 − x10 − x9 − x4 + 2x3 − x2 − x
e = −x15 + x12 − 2x11 + 2x10 − x9 + x8 − x7 − x5 + 2
y = 8x15 − 12x14 − 12x13 − 15x12 + 2x10 + 4x9 − 8x7 − 8/x5 − 18x4 + 14x3 − 18x2
− 5x− 5
Decryption
a = 5x15 − 6x14 + 2x13 − 3x12 − 12x10 − 4x9 + 6x8 − 15x7 + 4x6 − 12x5 − 10x4 + 10x3
− 14x2 − 10x+ 9
m = x15 + x12 + x7 + 1
NTRUSign
In 2001 some of the same people involved in standard NTRU published NTRUSign
[17] also based on polynomials and lattices. Unfortunately, it was quickly discovered that
it could be broken with far too few transcripts. An update was published in 2003 [16],
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but that was also shown to broken with too few transcripts [10]. The 2003 version of the
algorithm is included for completeness.
Definition 2.19 (NTRUSign). NTRUSign is a digital signature algorithm with four public
parameters, N the degree of the polynomials, q the coefficients modulus, N a norm bound
used to verify the signature and β a balancing factor where 0 < β ≤ 1.
• NTRUSign.KeyGen: The private keys are two small random polynomials, f and g,
that are invertible in Rq. For the public key, first find two polynomials F and G such
that
f ∗G− g ∗ F = q.
The public key is
h = F ∗ fq (mod q) = G ∗ gq (mod q)
• NTRUSign.Sign: To sign a document map it to a vector m ∈ [0, q)N using an agreed
upon hash function. Then set
(x, y) = (0,m)
 G −F
−g f







ε = −x and ε‘ = −y.
The signature s is calculated as
s = εf + ε‘g
• NTRUSign.Verify: To verify map the document to a vector m the same as it was for
signing. Then calculate
t = s ∗ h mod q.
Then calculate the norm
v = min
k1,k2∈R
(||s+ k1q||2 + β2||(t−m) + k2q||2)1/2.




N = 11,q = 32,β = 0.38 and N = 200
Key Generation
f = −x10 + x8 + x7 + x5 − x4 − x2 + 1
g = x10 + x7 + x6 − x5 − x4 − x2 + x
F = −3x10 − x8 + x7 + x6 − 3x5 − rs4 − x3 − x2 − 4x− 1
G = 2x10 + x8 − x7 + 4x6 + x5 + 3x4 + 3x2 − x+ 4
fq = 17x
10 + 9x9 + 3x8 + 8x7 + 12x6 + 2x5 + 4x4 + 18x3 + 20x2 + 26x+ 10
gq = 15x
10 + 12x9 + x84x
726x6 + 25x5 + 18x4 + 10x3 + 21x2 + 17x+ 12
h = 14x10 + 28x9 + 18x8 + 8x7 + 18x6 + 21x5 + 9x4 + 14x3 + 14x3 + 24x2 + 14x+ 8
Signing
m = 160x10 + 112x9 + 32x8 + 192x7 + 80x6 + 128x5 + 224x4 + 224x2 + 144x2 + 144x+ 32
x = −4x10 + 4x9 − 12x8 + 2x7 + 3x6 − 13x5 + 7x4 − 5x3 + 10x2 + 9x− 4
s = 3x10 + 2x9 + 2x8 − x7 − x6 − x5 + x3 − 2x2
Verification
t = −4x10 − 7x9 − 3x8 − 5x7 − 4x6 − 12x5 − 11x4 − x3 − 8x2 − 9x
v = 178
178 ≤ 200
Linear Secret Sharing Scheme
To define linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS), it is first necessary to define some of
the access structures used with LSSS. Access structures are used to define the share matrix
that is used to share the private key.
Definition 2.20 (Monotone Access Structure). Let P = {P1, · · · , PN} be a set of partici-
pants. A collection A ⊆ P(P ) is a monotone collection if for any sets B, C where B ∈ A
and B ⊆ C ⊆ P we have C ∈ A. A monotone access structure on P is a non-empty collec-
tion A ⊆ P(P ). The sets in A are the valid sets and sets from P(P ) that are not in A are
the invalid sets.
18
Example 2.6 (Monotone Access Structure).
Let P = {1,2,3,4}
Let A = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}
For any choice of B all supersets of B ∈ A
Example 2.7 (Non-monotone Access Structure).
Let P = {1, 2, 3, 4}
Let A = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}
If B = {1, 2} the possible values for C are {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4} and {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Only one possible value for C is in A.
A class of monotone access structures is the collection of monotone access structures
on P . A threshold access structure can be used to create a t-of-N threshold scheme where
only t of the N participants are required to successfully decrypt a ciphertext.
Definition 2.21 (Threshold Access Structure). Let P = {P1, · · · , PN} be a set of par-
ticipants. An access structure At is called a threshold access structure if for every set of
participants S ⊆ P , S ∈ At if and only if |S| ≥ t.
Definition 2.22 (Monotone Boolean Formula). A monotone Boolean formula
C : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}
is a Boolean circuit with the following properties
• There is a single output gate.
• Every gate is one of AND or OR gate with a fan-in 2 and fan-out 1.
• The input wires can have multiple fan-out.
Definition 2.23 (Monotone Boolean Formula Access Structure). Let P = {P1, · · · , PN}
be the set of participants and C : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}. An access structure AC is a monotone
Boolean formula access structure if for every set of participants S ⊆ P , S ∈ Q if and only
if C(x) = 1.
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A threshold access structure is a subset of the monotone Boolean formula access struc-
ture making it possible to write a 2-of-3 threshold as the Boolean formula (P1∧P2)∨ (P1∧
P3)∨ (P2∧P3). The ”Folklore” algorithm 2.2 can be used to convert a monotone Boolean
formula into a share matrix.
Algorithm 2.2 ”Folklore” Algorithm
Input: A special monotone Boolean formula C : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}
Output: An LSSS share matrix M for the access structure C.
1. Label the root r with the vector m1 = (1).
2. Set counter = 1
3. for each node n in the tree formed by C:
(a) If n is an OR, assign its children the value of m.
(b) if n is an AND, pad mn with 0’s to make it length count. Append a 1 to this
value and assign it to one of the children. Assign the other child a vector of
(0, ·,−1) of length count+ 1. Increase count by 1.
4. Take the leaf values and pad them with 0’s to make them of even size.
Example 2.8 (2-of-3 Access Matrix). Let C = (P1 ∧ P2) ∨ (P1 ∧ P3) ∨ (P2 ∧ P3)
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count m[count] left child right child
1 m[1] = (1)
1 m[1] = (1) m[2] = (1) m[5] = 1
1 m[2] = (1) m[3] = (1) m[4] = (1)
1 m[3] = (1) m[6] = (1,1) m[7] = (0,-1)
2 m[4] = (1) m[8] = (1,0,1) m[9] = (0,0,-1)
3 m[5] = (1) m[10] = (1,0,0,1) m[11] = (0,0,0,-1)
The share matrix is

1 1 0 0
0 −1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 −1 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 −1

Linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS) [4] use linear algebra and a shared matrix defined
by an access structure to take a private key and generate shared keys.
Definition 2.24 (Linear Secret Sharing Scheme). Let P = {P1, · · · , PN} be the set of
participants and S be a class of access structures on P . A secret sharing scheme SS with
secret key space K = Zp for some prime p is called a linear secret sharing scheme if:
• SS.Share(k,A): There exists a share matrix M ∈ Z`xNp with each party associated with
a partition Ti ⊆ [`]. To create secret shares of k, sample random values r2, · · · , rn
R←−
Zp and define a vector w = M · (k, r2, · · · , rn)T The shares for Pi consists of the
entries {wj}j∈Ti.
• SS.Combine(B): For any valid set S ∈ A
(1, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ span({M [j]}j∈∪i∈STi)
over Zp where M [j] is the jth row of M . Any valid set of parties S ∈ A can find the
coefficients {cj}j∈∪i∈STi satisfying∑
j∈∪i∈ST1
cj ·M [j] = (1, 0, · · · , 0)
and recover the secret by computing k =
∑
j∈∪i∈ST1
cj · wj. The coefficients {cj} are
called the recovery coefficients.
21
Example 2.9 ({0,1}-LSSS). Using the share matrix from Example 2.8 and p = 47.
1 1 0 0
0 −1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 −1 0
1 0 0 1

















• P1 gets 110 to use with P2 and 49 to use with P3
• P2 gets -63 to use with P1 and 62 to use with P3
• P3 gets -2 to use with P1 and -15 to use with P2
While LSSS works for secret sharing, it does not work well for threshold secret sharing.
A partial decryption would leak information about the share used in the decryption. One
way to resolve the issue would be to add noise to the decryption (LWE). However the noise
adds up quickly and causes decryption failures. A special case of LSSS called {0,1}-LSSS,
does work well by using a monotone Boolean formula access structure.
Definition 2.25 ({0,1}-LSSS). Let P = {P1, · · · , PN} be a set of participants. The class
of access structure {0, 1} − LSSSN is the collection of access structures A ∈ LSSSN for
which there exists a linear secret sharing scheme SS = (SS.Share, SS.Combine) over the
secret space K = Zp satisfying
• Let k be a shared secret and {wj}j∈TI be the share of participant Pi for i ∈ [N ]. For







Our scheme relies on a fully trusted dealer. The dealer will generate the key pair based
on the chosen NTRU variant and will be the only party to know the private key. There
will be N participants who fully trust the dealer, but not necessarily each other. We want
t of the N participants to be able to work together to decrypt a ciphertext. By requiring
only t of N , not all participants have to be online to perform a decryption and if one is
compromised it does not compromise the private key.
The dealer will be responsible for generating the key shares. The N participants will
be partitioned into a subset of t participants. This will generate N !t!(N−t)! partitions. For
each partition, a participant will have a key share to use with the other participants in the
partition. Each participant will have (N−1)!(t−1)!(N−t)! shares. The dealer will use a variation of
{0,1}-LSSS based on polynomials to generate the key shares.
The participants will need to treat their share as if it were a private key. The loss of
a single key would not compromise the private key, but a loss of all the keys for a valid
subset would reveal the private key. The participants will each create a partial decryption
using their share. The partial decryptions could be used to derive the participant’s share,
so we will need to mask the partial decryption. The mask will need to hide the share, but
at the same time it should not interfere in the final decryption. Once the participants have
generated the partial decryptions, they can be combined into the final decryption revealing
the plaintext message.
Working code for all three written using Sage can be found in the appendix. This is
proof of concept code only and should not be considered production worthy.
Key Sharing
Key sharing will use {0,1}-LSSS, however instead of multiplying the access matrix by
a column vector, a matrix is used. The first row of the matrix will be the private key, the
23
remaining rows will be vectors generated using the same rules used to generate the private
key. This works because we can change Zp to be Zmp in Definition 2.24 and the definition
will still hold.
Definition 3.1 (Polynomial Linear Secret Sharing Scheme). Let P = {P1, · · · , PN} be the
set of participants and S be a class of access structures on P . A secret sharing scheme SS
with secret key space K = Zmp for some prime p of degree m is called a polynomial linear
secret sharing scheme if:
• SS.Share(k,A): There exists a share matrix M ∈ Z`xNp with each party associated
with a partition Ti ⊆ [`]. To create secret shares of k, sample random polynomials
r2, ·, rn
R←− Zmp and define a matrix w = M · (k, r2, · · · , rn)T The shares for Pi consists
of the entries {wj}j∈Ti.
• SS.Combine(B): For any valid set S ∈ A
(1, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ span({M [j]}j∈∪i∈STi)
over Zmp where M [j] is the jth row of M . Any valid set of parties S ∈ A can find the
coefficients {cj}j∈∪i∈STi satisfying∑
j∈∪i∈ST1
cj ·M [j] = (1, 0, · · · , 0)
and recover the secret by computing k =
∑
j∈∪i∈ST1
cj · wj. The coefficients {cj} are
called the recovery coefficients.
Making the same change to Definition 2.25 gives
Definition 3.2 (Polynomial {0,1}-LSSS). Let P = {P1, · · · , PN} be a set of participants.
The class of access structure {0, 1} − LSSSN is the collection of access structures A ∈
LSSSN for which there exists a linear secret sharing scheme SS = (SS.Share, SS.Combine)
over the secret space K = Znp satisfying
• Let k be a shared secret and {wj}j∈TI be the share of participant Pi for i ∈ [N ]. For




For Stinson’s and NTRU with R-LWE, there is only one key to share. For standard
NTRU both f and fp must be shared, thus the sharing algorithm must be executed twice.
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Example 3.1 (Polynomial {0,1}-LSSS). Using the share matrix form Example 2.8 and the private
key from Example 2.3
M =

1 1 0 0
0 −1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 −1 0
1 0 0 1




1 0 −3 0 −3 0 0 0 3 −3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
1 −3 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 −3 0 −3 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 −3 0 0
−2 0 0 0 −3 3 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 −3 0 0 0 0 3 −3




2 −3 −3 3 −3 0 0 0 6 −6 0 −3 0 0 0 3 3 0 3 0 −3 0 0
−1 3 0 −3 0 0 0 0 −3 3 0 3 0 0 0 −3 −3 0 0 0 3 0 0
−1 0 −3 0 −6 3 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 −3 0 3 0 0 3 −3
2 0 0 0 3 −3 0 0 0 −3 −3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 −3 3
2 0 −3 0 −3 0 0 0 3 −3 −3 −3 0 3 0 0 0 3 3 3 −3 3 −3
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 −3 0 0 0 −3 0 −3 3 −3 3

• P1 gets row 0 to use with P2 and row 2 to use with P3.
• P2 gets row 1 to use with P1 and row 4 to use with P3.
• P3 gets row 3 to use with P1 and row 5 to use with P2
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Partial Decryption
Partial decryption for Stinson’s and NTRU with R-LWE works the same. Calculate the
first step in the decryption algorithm using the share instead of the private key. Let S be
a valid set of participants. Let si ∈ S for Pi. The partial decryption of ciphertext y is
ai = si ∗ y (mods q)
For standard NTRU the previous step uses the shares of f . The partial decryption is
combined, and the process is repeated with the shares of fp.
As defined, the partial decryption can leak the key share. Let t be the number of
participants in S. Let A = (a1, · · · , at) be the set of partial decryptions. Given A and y
it would be possible for an attacker to compute the shares and thus determine the private
key. To avoid this we use R-LWE from Definition 2.14 and add in a small error to each ai.
Definition 3.3 (Partial Decryption).
• SNTRU.PartialDecrypt and pNE.PartialDecryption: Let S be a set of the shares of
valid participants. Let si ∈ S. Let ei be an independently generated polynomial using
a discrete Gaussian distribution with a small standard deviation for the coefficients.
For each si ∈ S
ai = si ∗ y + p ∗ ei (mods q)
• NTRU.PartialDecryption: Let Sf be the set of shares of f for t valid participants. Let
sfi ∈ Sf where i ∈ {1, · · · , t} Let ei be an independently generated polynomial using
a discrete Gaussian distribution with a small standard deviation for the coefficients.
For each sfi ∈ S
ci = sfi ∗ y + p ∗ ei (mods q)





Let Sfp be the set of shares of fp for t valid participants. Let sfpi ∈ Sfp where
i ∈ {1, · · · , t}. Let epi be an independently generated polynomial using a discrete
Gaussian distribution with a small standard deviation for the coefficients. For each
sfpiinSp
ai = sfpi ∗ b+ p ∗ epi (mods q)
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Example 3.2 (Partial Decryption for SNTRU and pNE). Using the keys and ciphertext
from Example 2.3 and the shares generated in Example 3.1. P1 and P2 would like to decrypt
the ciphertext y. P1 calculates
s1 = −3x20 + 3x18 + 3x17 + 3x16 − 3x12 − 3x10 − 3x9 + 6x8 − 3x4 + 3x3 − 3x2 − 3x+ 2
e1 = x
22 + x20 − 2x19 − x18 + x17 − x15 + x14 − x13 + 2x11 − x10 + x8 − 2x6 − x5 − x4
+ x− 1
a1 = s1 ∗ y + p ∗ e1 (mods q)
a1 = −2x22 − x21 + 5x20 − 6x19 + 8x18 + 15x17 + 12x16 + 7x15 − 8x14 + 15x13 − 11x12
− 5x11 − 13x10 + 3x9 − 2x8 + 4x7 + 10x6 − 10x5 − 15x4 − 13x3 − 9x2 + x+ 15
P2 calculates
s2 = 3x
20 − 3x17 − 3x16 + 3x12 + 3x10 − 3x8 − 3x3 + 3x− 1
e2 = −x21 − 2x20 + x18 + 2x17 − x16 − x15 − 2x12 − x9 + 2x8 + 2x4 + x3 − x+ 1
a2 = s2 ∗ y + p ∗ e2 (mods q)
a2 = 11x
22 + x21 − 14x20 − 3x19 − 8x18 − 9x17 − 15x16 − 6x15 + 11x14 − 12x13 + 4x12
+ 2x11 + 13x10 − 3x9 + 11x8 − 9x7 + 15x6 + 7x5 − 7x4 − 12x3 + 15x2 − 4x− 10
Example 3.3 (Partial Decryption for Standard NTRU). Using the keys and ciphertext
from Example 2.2 P1 and P2 would like to decrypt the ciphertext y. P1 calculates
sf1 = −x10 + 2 ∗ x9 − 2 ∗ x4 + x2 + 2 ∗ x− 1
e1 = x
10 − x8 + x7 − x
c1 = sf1 ∗ y + p ∗ e1 (mods q)
c1 = x
10 − 4x9 − 12x8 + 11x7 + 7x6 − 2x5 + 12x4 − 13x3 + 2x2 + 5x− 7
P2 calculates
sf2 = −x9 + x6 + x4 − x
e2 = −x8 + x7 + x4 − 1
c2 = sf2 ∗ y + p ∗ e2 (mods q)
c2 = −5x10 + x9 + 11x8 + 2x7 − x6 + 9x5 + x4 + 2x3 − 12x2 − 15x+ 7
P1 and P2 calculate
b = c1 + c2 = −4x10 − 3x9 − x8 + 13x7 + 6x6 + 7x5 + 13x4 − 11x3 − 10x2 − 10x
27
Next P1 calculates
sfp1 = −x10 + 2x9 + x8 + 2x7 + x5 + 2x4 + 3x3 − x2 + 2x+ 2
ep1 = −x10 + x9 − x7 + x
a1 = −x10 + x9 − x8 − x7 − x6 − x5 − x4 − x3 + x− 1
P2 calcuates
sfp2 = x
10 − x3 + x2 − 1
ep2 = −x10 + x8 − x7 + 1
a2 = −x10 + x7 + x6 + x5 − x3 − x
Final Decryption
Final decryption for all three is the sum of the partial decryptions mods q and mods p.
Definition 3.4 (Final Decryption).
• FinalDecrypt: Let S be a set of valid participants. Let t be the number of participants
in S. Let A = (a1, · · · , at) be the set of partial decryptions. The final decryption of




ai (mods q)) (mods p)
Example 3.4 (Final Decryption). Using the partial decryptions from Example 3.2:
a1 + a2 = 9x
22 + 9x21 − 15x20 + 3x19 + 25x17 − 3x16 + 7x15
− 25x14 + 25x13 − 4x12 + 16x11 − 25x10 + 3x9 + x7 + 25x6
+ 3x5 + 3x4 − 28x3 + 3x2 − 6x− 1
(a1 + a2 (mods q)) (mods p) = x
15 − x12 + x7 − 1
Proof. Proof of Correctness for Stinson’s and NTRU With R-LWE. Let S be a set of valid




ai (mods q)) (mods p)
ai is defined as
ai = si ∗ y + p ∗ ei (mods q)
28




si ∗ y + p ∗ ei (mods q) (mods q)) (mods p)




si ∗ y (mods q) (mods q)) (mods p) + (
t∑
i





si ∗ y (mods q)) (mods p)




si) ∗ y (mods q) (mods p)
Recall from Definition 3.2 the sum of the shares is the private key giving
f ∗ y (mods q) (mods p)
Which is the original decryption formula.
The proof for standard NTRU is similar. In the previous proof, replace S with Sf , the
result is the formula for the first step of standard NTRU decryption. Repeat the proof
using Sfp for S and a for y. The result of this proof is the second formula from standard
NTRU.
Chapter 4
Security and Related Work
Related Work
A 2018 paper by Andrew Xia [35] covers a similar topic. That paper uses multiparty
computation to create a dealer free threshold multi-key fully homomorphic lattice-based
encryption scheme. The multiparty computation allows the participants to negotiate the
shares without a dealer and without revealing the secret keys. Fully homomorphic means
addition and multiplication can be performed without having to decrypt the message. In
this paper we focus on single key threshold lattice-based encryption with a dealer. We also
provide examples and working prototypes to validate the functionality of the scheme.
Key Sharing Security
One avenue of attack with secret sharing is to recover the key from one or more shares
from a partition. Could a possessor of a share use that share to discover the private key?
The way the shares are generated, they are random. The possessor of a share will not be
able to reconstruct the private key.
Under certain conditions, the primary share for standard and Stinson’s NTRU can leak
information about the private key in certain cases. For each exponent, the primary share
coefficient is the sum of the matching coefficients from the private key and the random
polynomials. Let N be the degree of the polynomials. Let i ∈ [0, N − 1]. Let t be the
number of polynomials in the partition. Let t0 be the primary key and the remaining the




If the coefficients are all the same value, the sum divided by t will reveal the coefficient of
the primary key. For example, if the coefficients are all 3 and there are 5 polynomials in the
partition, the sum will be 15 and 15/5 = 3. To avoid the leakage, reject any combination
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of private key and random polynomials where all coefficients are the same value for the
respective exponent.
The R-LWE variant does not have this problem. The coefficient range of the private key
for the R-LWE version is much larger. There are no values that would stand out as unusual.
Although 99.7% of the coefficients will be within 3 standard deviations fo the mean, there
is a 0.3% chance a coefficient will be abnormally large.
With this condition in place, the primary share does not leak any information about
the private key. The random polynomials added to the private key obfuscate enough to
make extracting the private key from the share computationally expensive. The lowest
recommended value for N is 439, the number of combinations to test would be 3439. It
would be higher for NTRU with R-LWE since the coefficients are not limited to three
values.
Partial Decryption Security
Given a partial decryption, could an attacker recover the key share? If partial decryption
was unmodified and an attacker had both the ciphertext and partial decryption, it would
be possible, but difficult, to derive the share used. The security of the partial decryption
can be enhanced by adding a small error.
The security of a partial decryption for NTRU with R-LWE can be derived directly from
R-LWE 2.14 with slight changes. Let Φx be xN + 1 an irreducible polynomial. The finite
quotient is Zq/(xN + 1). Instead of s being a secret it is the ciphertext and ai(x) are the
shared keys. We have redefined what needs to be kept secret. The values for ei(x) are small
independent random unknown polynomials with the coefficients sampled from the R-LWE
error distribution. Having met the requirements for R-LWE security we can say the partial
decryptions are provably secure.
The same security argument cannot be applied to standard nor Stinson’s NTRU. The
value of Φ(x) is xN − 1 which is reducible. The rest of the R-LWE requirements hold, the
values for ei are still small random independent unknown polynomials with the coefficients
sampled form the R-LWE error distribution. This alters the result just enough to make
deriving the key share from the partial decryption sufficiently complex but does not interfere




With the key shares properly masked, there are no secrets to protect in the final de-
cryption. Combining the partial decryptions to get the plaintext is a safe operation. The




Threshold cryptography provides a secure way to keep a secret online long term. A
user, Bob, can generate a public/private key. After choosing how many servers, N , and a
threshold, t, Bob will create shares of the private key to distribute to the N servers. The
servers can work together to decrypt ciphertext for Bob. The t servers will generate partial
decryptions that can be used to recover the plaintext. The partial decryptions are generated
in a way to avoid leaking the key share. Should a key share be compromised it will not
reveal Bob’s private key. If less than t shares are compromised, Bob can regenerate and
distribute new shares to the servers. Bob’s private key is still secure and the compromised
share is no longer a threat.
In this paper, we explained how to create a threshold cryptography scheme for three
variants of the lattice-based encryption scheme NTRU. We defined a version of {0,1}-LSSS
that works with polynomials to share a private key. The decryption algorithms of standard,
Stinson’s, and R-LWE NTRU were modified to include partial and final decryption steps.
Throughout chapter 3 we included concrete examples of the different steps. Finally, we
included a proof of correctness for the equations involved in the partial and final decryptions.
In chapter 4, we discussed the security of key sharing and partial decryption. When cor-
rectly constructed, the shares do not leak information about the private key. The only way
to reconstruct the private key is to acquire t of N shares from the same partition, excluding
a brute force attack. The shares are used to securely partially decrypt the ciphertext. We












for i in range(len(coeffs)):
coeffs[i] = coeffs[i] % m




return R([ i % m for i in f.list()])
def poly_mod_2(poly):
k = 0; b = 1; c = 0*x
f = poly; g = x^N - 1
res = False
f = mods(f, 2)
while True:





c = mods(c, 2)
k += 1
if f.is_one():
e = (-k) % N
retval = x^e * b
res = True
break
elif f.degree() == -1 or f.is_zero():
break





f = mods(f, 2)
c = mods(c, 2)
if res:
retval = retval % (x^N - 1)





success, b = poly_mod_2(poly)
if success:
qr = 2
while qr < q:
qr = qr^2
b = b * (2 - poly * b)
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k = 0; b = 1; c = 0*x
f = poly; g = x^N - 1
res = false
while True:





e = (-k) % N




e = (-k) % N
retval = -x^e * b
res = True
break
elif f.degree() == 1 or f.is_zero():
break
if f.degree() < g.degree():
f,g = g,f
b,c = c,b







f = mods(f, 3)
c = mods(c, 3)
if res:
retval = retval % (x^N - 1)














n0 = N - 2*n1
#generating an invertable f is not as easy as the other two
#using a constant key known to work.
f = -1 + x + x^2 - x^4 + x^6 + x^9 - x^10
g = -1 + x^2 + x^3 + x^5 - x^8 - x^10
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# Compute h(x)
success, fp = poly_mod_3(f)
if not success:
print("Something went wrong")
success, fq = poly_mod_prime_pow(f)
if not success:
print("Something went wrong")
h = mods((p * fq * g) % (x^N - 1), q)
# encrypt
m = -1 + x^3 - x^4 - x^8 + x^9 + x^10
r = sample() #-1 + x^2 + x^3 + x^4 - x^5 - x^7
e = mod((r*h+m) % (x^N - 1), q)
fKeys = [f, sample(), sample(), sample()]
v = 4*[[]]
for i in range(len(fKeys)):
v[i] = fKeys[i].list()
v[i] += (N - len(v[i]))*[0]
alpha = sqrt((2*N)/pi)






fShares = [R(s.list()) for s in fsm]
partial = [mods((s*e + p*Da())%(x^N - 1), q) for s in fShares]
print("b with shares")
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print("p12 + p21:", mods(partial[0]+partial[1],q))
print("p13 + p31:", mods(partial[2]+partial[3],q))
print("p23 + p32:", mods(partial[4]+partial[5],q))
partial[0] = partial[1] = mods(partial[0]+partial[1],q)
partial[2] = partial[3] = mods(partial[2]+partial[3],q)
partial[4] = partial[5] = mods(partial[4]+partial[5],q)
fpKeys = [fp, sample(), sample(), sample()]
v = 4*[[]]
for i in range(len(fpKeys)):
v[i] = fpKeys[i].list()





fpShares = [R(s.list()) for s in fpsm]
for i in range(len(partial)):
partial[i] = mod(partial[i],p)
partial[i] = mods((fpShares[i] * partial[i] + p*Da()) % (x^N - 1),p)
print("fp = ", fp)
print("fq = ", fq)
print("h = ", h)
print("m = ", m)
print("r = ", r)
print("e = ", e)
print("m‘ with shares:")
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print("p12 + p21:", mods(mods(partial[0]+partial[1],q), p))
print("p13 + p31:", mods(mods(partial[2]+partial[3],q), p))












for i in range(len(coeffs)):
coeffs[i] = coeffs[i] % m




return R([ i % m for i in f.list()])
def poly_mod_2(poly):
k = 0; b = 1; c = 0*x
f = poly; g = x^N - 1
res = False
f = mods(f, 2)
while True:




c = mods(c, 2)
k += 1
if f.is_one():
e = (-k) % N
retval = x^e * b
res = True
break
elif f.degree() == -1 or f.is_zero():
break





f = mods(f, 2)
c = mods(c, 2)
if res:
retval = retval % (x^N - 1)





success, b = poly_mod_2(poly)
if success:
qr = 2
while qr < q:
qr = qr^2
b = b * (2 - poly * b)
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k = 0; b = 1; c = 0*x
f = poly; g = x^N - 1
res = false
while True:





e = (-k) % N




e = (-k) % N
retval = -x^e * b
res = True
break
elif f.degree() == 1 or f.is_zero():
break
if f.degree() < g.degree():
f,g = g,f
b,c = c,b







f = mods(f, 3)
c = mods(c, 3)
if res:
retval = retval % (x^N - 1)














n0 = N - 2*n1
alpha = sqrt((2*N)/pi)




f = p*F + 1
g = p*G
# Compute h(x)
success, fq = poly_mod_prime_pow(f)
if not success:
print("Something went wrong")
h = mods((fq * g) % (x^N - 1), q)
# encrypt
m = -1 + x^3 - x^4 - x^8 + x^9 + x^10
r = sample()
e = mod((r*h+m) % (x^N - 1), q)
fKeys = [f, p*sample() + 1,p*sample() + 1,p*sample() + 1]
v = 4*[[]]
for i in range(len(fKeys)):
v[i] = fKeys[i].list()










fShares = [R(s.list()) for s in fsm]
partial = [mods((s*e + p*Da())%(x^N - 1), q) for s in fShares]
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print("fq = ", fq)
print("h = ", h)
print("m = ", m)
print("r = ", r)
print("e = ", e)
print("m‘ with shares:")
print("p12 + p21:", mods(mods(partial[0]+partial[1],q), p))
print("p13 + p31:", mods(mods(partial[2]+partial[3],q), p))
print("p23 + p32:", mods(mods(partial[4]+partial[5],q), p))
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Appendix C












for i in range(len(coeffs)):
coeffs[i] = coeffs[i] % m





R2 = PolynomialRing(Z,’a’); a = R2.gen()





Ds = DiscreteGaussianDistributionPolynomialSampler(R, N, sigma)
f = p * Ds() + 1
fq = inverse_mods(f, q)
g = Ds()
gq = inverse_mods(f, q)
h = mods((fq * p * g) % (x^N + 1), q)
Da = DiscreteGaussianDistributionPolynomialSampler(R, N, alpha)
r = Da()
e = Da()
m = x^15 + x^12 + x^7 + 1
y = mods((r*h+p*e+m) % (x^N + 1), q)
#compute shares
keys = [f, p*Ds()+1, p*Ds()+1, p*Ds()+1]
v = 4*[[]]
for i in range(len(keys)):
v[i] = keys[i].list()




shares = [R(s.list()) for s in sm]
partial = []
for i in range(len(shares)):




















print("p12 + p21:", mods(mods(partial[0]+partial[1],q), p))
print("p13 + p31:", mods(mods(partial[2]+partial[3],q), p))
print("p23 + p32:", mods(mods(partial[4]+partial[5],q), p))
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